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ARE LEGAL AID SOCIETIES, LAWYER REFERRAL
SERVICES AND GROUP LEGAL SERVICES ADEQUATE
UNDER THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY?
While other professions have attempted to make their services
more readily available in recent years, the legal profession's avail-
ability has remained relatively static. Today there is a considerable
lack of legal services for a great majority of the people. This lack
of available services is most critical in the lower and middle income
classes.' Only recently have any remedies to this problem been
suggested and actively undertaken. Legal aid societies, lawyer re-
ferral services and group legal service plans are the three primary
methods used to combat the problem. Legal aid societies are pri-
marily for lower income individuals while group legal service plans
and lawyer referral services are mainly for use by the middle class. 2
However, at this time only the legal aid societies and the lawyer
referral plans have become workable tools. Group legal service pro-
grams are not yet sufficiently established to provide adequate relief.
It is the purpose of this article to consider the effect of these
programs on the lower and middle income classes. Since legal aid
societies and lawyer referral plans are becoming well established,
the first portion of this paper will be devoted to a brief history of
legal aid societies and lawyer referral plans and the development
of the present need for group legal service plans. It will be shown
that even though both legal aid societies and lawyer referral plans
are providing more people in the low and middle classes with legal
services, there still is a failure to provide legal services for the
middle class. A detailed consideration of group legal service plans
case law will then be developed in an effort to demonstrate how
acceptable such plans are to the courts.
The second portion of the article will be devoted to a critical
analysis of why the legal aid societies and lawyer referral plans are
so widely accepted when group legal service plans are struggling
for recognition. Of particular importance will be a discussion of
the old Canons of Ethics and the new Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. It will be shown that the American Bar Association and the
' B. CHRIsTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970); M.
BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WrTH LAwYERs (1969).
2 B. CHmsTENsoN, supra note 1, at 190.
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legal profession in general have seen fit to make express provisions
in the new Code to accommodate legal aid societies and lawyer
referral plans. Particular attention will be given to the absence of
adequate provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility to
support group legal service plans.
AN INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE GROWING NEED
The two initial responses to the need for legal services for the
low and middle income classes came in the development of legal aid
societies and lawyer referral plans. The former, providing charitable
assistance,3 was aimed at individuals in the poverty class without
the means to afford legal services. The latter was formed for those
individuals whose incomes were too great to qualify for legal aid
but needed assistance in contacting available attorneys. As the
Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral Services of the American
Bar Association noted:
The referral service and legal aid are closely related. Both
represent an effort to make the services of the profession available
to all people regardless of means. Whenever a legal aid office is
established there arises almost immediately a need for some form
of referral plan because clients of means are ineligible for the
services of legal aid, yet the latter is obviously reluctant to send
such people away without advice as to how the services of a lawyer
may be obtained. On the other hand, if a referral service is set up
in a community that has no legal aid of any kind, prospective clients
who lack the means of paying even the moderate fee of the referral
service will quickly point up the community's need for legal aid.4
The Committee then considered the present state of affairs of the
legal aid and lawyer referral services.
The profession has not worked up anything as spectacular as the
Blue Cross, which provides forty million people, one-quarter of the
entire nation, with assistance toward the obtaining of medical care.
However, the device of legal aid has set an example of organized
bar association activity in the direction of better public under-
standing of the work of lawyers, in addition to making substantial
inroads in the legal problems of the indigent class. The lawyer
referral service presents a plan whereby the services of the entire
profession are made available to the greatest single group in the
nation's population, the often forgotten class of people who have
moderate means.5
3 AamICAN BAR ASsOcIATION, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWYER REFERRAL
SEmcEs 19 (4th ed. 1958).
4 Id. at 18.
5 Id. at 5.
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Even though both the legal aid societies and the lawyer referral
services have been highly successful, "there is an unfulfilled public
need for legal services . . . the public from time to time is con-
fronted with problems for which legal assistance would be on any
standard, highly desirable, but where legal assistance is not ob-
tained."G
To solve this problem of ever-increasing need, the development
of group legal services is required.
• .."[G]roup Legal Services" mean that legal services are being
performed by a member of the bar to a group of individuals who
have a common problem or problems, or who have joined together
as a means of best bargaining for a predetermined position, or who
have voluntarily formed or become a member of an association
with the idea that such association shall perform a service to its
members in a particular field or activity, or where by virtue of
common interest of an employer or employee it appears that the or-
ganization can gain a benefit to the members as a whole. Examples
of such organizations are labor unions, employer organizations,
trade organizations, teachers' groups, civil service employees of the
state, county, or city, club members of a social club or of an auto-
mobile club, or fraternal organization, and numerous other such
groups. Included also in the definition may be groups who may
associate themselves together for the purpose of establishing a plan
to be rendered to individual members thereof, whether or not the
members have a common interest in a certain field or activity.7
Prior to the development of group legal service plans laymen
had asked the legal profession why "individuals may band together
to provide themselves with cheaper insurance, cheaper groceries,
higher wages, better prices, easier credits, lower taxes, better
health-everything, except better or cheaper legal advice or aid?" s
The legal profession responded with positive group legal assistance
in clubs, 9 trade unions' ° and associations.'i It seems quite probable
therefore that the problem of providing adequate legal service for
the greatest number of people will fall into the category of group
legal service plans.
6 Report of Committee on Group Legal Services, 39 CAL. S.B.J. 639, 652
(1964).
7 Committee Report-Group Legal Services, 35 CAL. S.B.J. 710, 712
(1960).
8 Weihofen, Practice of Law by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social
Utility, 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 119, 128 (1934).
9 See, e.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club,
362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935).
1o See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217 (1967); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
11 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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With this general background of how the development of legal
aid societies and lawyer referral plans led to the adoption of large
scale group legal service arrangements, consideration will now be
given to the case law development of group legal service plans.
THE JUDICIARY'S DEVELOPMENT
OF GROUP LEGAL SERVICES
The development of the group legal service plan is in large part
attributable to the court's aid. One of the first cases involving the
group legal service issue was a New York decision 2 in which a
company had maintained a staff of attorneys to furnish its sub-
scribers with legal advice and service. In invalidating the plan the
New York court said:
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant
in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust
and confidence. It cannot be delegated without consent, and it can-
not exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to practice
law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would be subject
to the directions of the corporation.... The bar, which is an insti-
tution of the highest usefulness and standing, would be degraded
if even its humblest member became subject to the orders of a
money-making corporation engaged not in conducting litigation for
itself, but in the business of conducting litigation for others.13
In the years following, the courts struck down all attempts to
form group legal service plans within home-owners' associations,14
taxpayers' associations15 and motorists' groups' 6 for many of the
same reasons as stated in the New York opinion. However, in 1932
the Illinois Appellate Court in Ryan v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 17
recognized a right of association for the purpose of attaining legal
services. Ryan involved a regional counsel for the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen who brought an action against the Pennsylvania
Railroad to collect his fees. The attorney was available to the
employees under an agreement between the union and selected
attorneys to provide legal services. The attorney claimed the fees
pursuant to a contingent fee contract with one of the railroad's
injured employees who was a member of the Brotherhood. The
12 In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
'3 Id. at 483-84, 92 N.E. at 16.
14 Dworken v. Department Home Owners Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176
N.E. 577 (1931).
15 People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354
Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933).
16 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595, 188
N.E. 827 (1933).
17 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932).
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employee, without the attorney's consent or knowledge, had made
a settlement with the railroad after suit had been initiated. The
railroad defended on the ground that the contract of employment
was contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable. The
court rejected this argument and stated: "The evidence, introduced
by respondent, shows clearly the worthy purpose of the [group
legal services] department and the necessity for its organization
and maintenance."' s
The next major advancement for group legal service plans came
in four United States Supreme Court decisions: NAACP v. Button;19
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar;20 United
Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar;21 and United Trans-
portation Union v. State Bar of Michigan.22 NAACP v. Button in-
volved the Virginia Conference of NAACP branches. The Virginia
branch had a staff of fifteen attorneys elected by the local NAACP
staff. The attorneys followed NAACP legal guidelines and limited
their case load to only those cases involving racial discrimination.
The NAACP defrayed the cost of all litigation, and the lawyers
were paid a rate somewhat lower than "normal." In cases handled
by these attorneys the litigant was retaining the services of the
staff and not any one particular attorney.
The NAACP brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state
statute which prohibited attorneys from soliciting business through
lay intermediaries on the ground that, when applied to NAACP
activities, it was in violation of the First Amendment. The United
States Supreme Court struck down the statute and found that:
[Under the statute] a person who advises another that his legal
rights have been infringed and refers him to a particular attorney
or group of attorneys... for assistance has committed a crime ....
There thus inheres in the statute the gravest danger of smothering
all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on
behalf of the rights of members of an unpopular minority.23
The court felt that "[f]ree trade in ideas means free trade in the
opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts. '24
The NAACP case symbolizes the political freedoms of expression
and association under the First Amendment which serve as the
basis for later court decisions upholding group legal service plans.
18 Id. at 374.
19 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
20 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
21 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
22 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
23 371 U.S. 415, 434 (1963).
24 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
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The second major case involved the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen.25 A plan 26 was created by the union whereby the mem-
bers could avail themselves of a group of lawyers referred to them
by the union. The union officials and members of the legal profes-
sion had sensed a need on the part of workers to receive representa-
tion in the area of injury settlements. Through the union arrange-
ment lawyers were selected on the basis of strong moral character
and competence, and the purpose of the plan was "to channel legal
employment to the particular lawyers approved by the Brother-
hood."2 7 Because of the expected quantity of claims for representa-
tion, the legal fees were reduced. The Virginia Court found that
the plan violated the state's rules against solicitation of legal busi-
ness and the unauthorized practice of law. The Supreme Court re-
versed and held that the plan was protected under the First
Amendment.
[First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition and
assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together for the
lawtl purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the
rights Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the
Federal Employer's Liability Act.... The right of the members to
consult with each other in a fraternal organization necessarily in-
cludes the right to select a spokesman from their ranks who could
be expected to give the wisest counsel. That is the role played by
the members who carry out the legal aid programs. And the right
of workers personally or through a special department of their
Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistance-
and, most importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently
rely on-is an inseparable part of this constitutionally guaranteed
right to assist and advise each other.28
While the argument could be made that Button was a political deci-
sion, one is hard pressed to make that claim concerning the BRT
decision. The BRT case provided further proof that group legal
service plans are a legal and necessary institution.
It was found that the group legal service plans upheld in BRT
provided these functions:
The public awareness function is the utilization of the group to
appraise the members of their legal rights and of the general avail-
ability of lawyers to vindicate those rights. In Button it was civil
rights, in BRT claims under the FELA.
25 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
26 Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services in Prospective, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 279, 281 (1965).
27 377 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
28 Id. at 5, 6.
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The contacting function is the bringing together of the client and
a particular lawyer. It can be described invidiously as "channel-
ing"; in more invidious or extreme forms it can be termed "run-
ning." Certainly, solicitation and advertising in the traditionally
prohibited sense of lawyers making their availability known in
acceptable ways are involved. For this is the function served by
the group when it recommends, as did both the NAACP and the
Brotherhood, particular lawyers to prospective clients to handle
their legal affairs.
The economic function relates to the pricing of legal services.
A group may affect the price of legal services which any one client
pays in two ways. The first is by adoption of an insurance principle,
spreading the cost over a large number of potential clients (i.e., the
members of the group) so that the financial burden of the individual
legal service which might otherwise fall on one member is borne by
all. All members of the group who are equally likely to be subject
to the cost, but those who do not happen to be will, nonetheless,
share it. The second way is by increasing the volume of particular
kinds of legal services so as to render the handling of any one
instance more efficient and thus less costly.29
Once the BRT decision was rendered, those that had previously
felt that the NAACP decision was based purely on political grounds
began to consider future activities of group legal service plans. In
the United Mine Workers case8 ° the Court was faced with a group
legal service that was one step removed from BRT. The union re-
tained a lawyer and paid him an annual salary. His sole duty was
to represent any of the workers in workmen's compensation
disputes; thus, the only contact the union had with the lawyer was
the payment of his salary. When the employee had a claim, the
attorney would investigate it and try to procure a settlement. If
satisfactory terms could not be procured, the lawyer and the em-
ployee would take the case before the Illinois Industrial Commis-
sion. All payments went directly to the employee.
The Illinois State Bar Association sought injunctive relief against
what they termed to be an unauthorized practice of law. The Illinois
Supreme Court granted the relief on the grounds that Button ap-
plied only where political rights were involved and that BRT only
applied to a referral system. The United States Supreme Court
again reversed and held that "the freedom of speech, assembly, and
petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives
petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its
members in the assertion of their legal rights."31 The Supreme
Court based their decision on a balancing test, finding that the
29 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 285-86.
30 United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
31 Id. at 221-22.
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state's interest in regulating such conduct was not equal to the
rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The most recent case concerning group legal services is United
Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan.32 The Michigan Bar
in their complaint against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
charged "that the union recommended selective attorneys to its
members and their families, that it secured a commitment from
those attorneys that the maximum fee charged would not exceed
25% of the recovery, and that it recommended Chicago lawyers to
represent Michigan claimants. '33 The Supreme Court held that the
injunctive relief granted by the Supreme Court of Michigan was
overbroad as violating the First Amendment rights of the union and
its members to engage in collective activity to obtain meaningful
access to the courts.
In speaking for the majority of the court Mr. Justice Black found
that the opinion in BRT "left no doubt that workers have a right
under the First Amendment to act collectively to secure good,
honest lawyers to assert their claims against railroads."34  He
further declared that if free legal services were available under
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, then the Bar
was now precluded from challenging the validity of a 25% guaran-
teed charge.
In upholding the complete validity of the Brotherhood plan the
court reiterated its prior holdings:
At issue is the basic right to group legal action, a right first
asserted in this Court by an association of Negroes seeking the
protection of freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The com-
mon threat running through our decision in NAACP v. Button,
Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that collective activity un-
dertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within the protection of the First Amendment.35
Through these four decisions the Court has realized the present
and future importance of legal assistance for all and has also pro-
vided a constitutional foundation. Although it can readily be seen
that there is more than adequate support for group legal service
programs in the case law, the group legal service plans cannot be
effective without adequate support of the American Bar Association
and the legal profession in general. In the following section it will
be shown that although the Code of Professional Responsibility ex-
32 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
33 Id. at 577.
4 Id. at 579.
35 Id. at 585.
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pressly authorizes the legal profession to support legal aid societies
and lawyer referral services, there is no such express authorization
concerning group legal service plans.
FROM THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS TO THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
BACKGROUND
The Canons of Professional Ethics and now the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility guide lawyers and judges in this area of the
law and the practice as well as others. A tracing of the Canons
and the Code will help lay a ground work of understanding in the
areas of legal aid, lawyer referral plans and group legal services.
Until quite recently, case law that dealt with any ethical con-
sideration at all was faced with antiquated Canons:
The original 32 Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1908. They were based principally
on the Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association
in 1887, which in turn had been borrowed largely from the lectures
of Judge George Sharswood, published in 1854 under the title of
Professional Ethics. Since then a limited number of amendments
have been adopted on a piecemeal basis.36
After continued debate, and a failure of the Canons to provide
adequate guidelines, a Special Committee on evaluation of the ABA
began in 1964 the drafting of a new Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and Canons of Professional Ethics.
As APPLIED TO LEGAL AID SERVICES AND LAWYER REFERRAL PLANS
Legal aid societies, lawyer referral plans and group legal service
plans have been affected most by Canons 27 and 28 (solicitation and
advertising), 35 (lay intermediaries) and 47 (unauthorized practice
of law).
In 1925 the American Bar Association promulgated Opinion No.
8 which in effect said that a lawyer could not accept employment
as a part-time employee of the legal department of an auto club
which offered legal assistance to its members. It was felt this was
a form of solicitation and exploitation of professional services by
a lay intermediary.37 As a response to this, Canon 35 was adopted
36 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILITY at i (1965) [hereinafter
cited as CODE].
37 See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 163 (1953).
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in 1928.8 The Canon expressly provided that "charitable societies
rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries."
Therefore, legal aid societies are not one of the prohibited lay
intermediaries provided for in Canon 35.
It has further been found that Canon 2739 and 2840 were not
violated by the legal aid societies. It was felt by many that:
38 Canon 35 provides: "The professional services of a lawyer should not
be controlled or exploited by any lay agency personal or corporate,
which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibili-
ties and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations
which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of
such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be per-
sonal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable
societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed such inter-
mediaries. A lawyer may accept employment from any organization
such as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal
services in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, -is
interested, but this employment should not include the rendering of
legal services to the members of such organization in respect to their
individual affairs."
39 Canon 27 provides: '9t is unprofessional to solicit professional employ-
ment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations.
Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnish-
ing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to
be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magni-
tude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the
tone of our profession and are reprehensible .... ".
40 Canon 28 provides: "It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife
and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common
law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of
action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or
collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of
action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or
runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office,
or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hos-
pital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and
the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services.
A duty to the public and to the profession develops upon every
member of the Bar having knowledge of such practices upon the
part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end
that the offender may be disbarred."
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Canons 27 and 28 were not designed and should not be interpreted
to restrict the activities of attorneys who wish to offer their services
free, on a pro bono publico basis. The Canons are directed against
the commercialization of the legal profession, and are designed to
restrict the activities of persons more interested in making money
than in serving the interests of the law.41
The American Bar Association has also given strong support to
this interpretation. The American Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics stated:
The defense of indigent citizens, without compensation, is car-
ried on throughout the country by lawyers representing legal aid
societies, not only with the approval but with the commendation of
those acquainted with the work. Not infrequently services are ren-
dered out of sympathy or for other philanthropic reasons, by in-
dividual lawyers who do not represent legal aid societies. There is
nothing whatever in the Canons to prevent a lawyer from perform-
ing such an act, nor should there be.42
The present Code of Professional Responsibility expressly pro-
vides a sound ethical basis for both legal aid societies and lawyer
referral services. According to Ethical Consideration 2-15, "lawyers
should support the principle of lawyer referral systems and should
encourage the evolution of other ethical plans which aid in the selec-
tion of qualified counsel. ' 43 Ethical Consideration 2-16 lends further
support by stating that "persons unable to pay all or a portion of
a reasonable fee should be able to obtain necessary legal services,
and lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities
designed to achieve that objective."44 Disciplinary Rule 2-103 (C) (D)
provides a more expanded basis for protecting lawyers who choose
to become involved in such plans from disciplinary action from the
bar association.45
The express authority for legal aid societies and lawyer referral
plans has been adequately demonstrated. The Code not only pro-
vides authorization for these two methods, it provides protection
for lawyers that participate in them. It is, however, undeniably
evident that these express provisions do not adequately provide
for group legal service plans.
41 Padnos, Legal Aid and Legal Ethics, 5 GA. S.B.J. 347, 348 (1958).
42 ABA CoMm. ON PRoFEssIoNAL ETmIcs, OPINIONS, No. 148 (1935).
43 CODE Canon No. 2, EC 2-15.
44 CODE Canon No. 2, EC 2-16.
45 See CODE Canon No. 2, DR 2-103 (C) (D).
LEGAL AID SOCIETIES
As APPLIED TO GROUP LEGAL SERVICES
The same type of ethical arguments and considerations that
have been considered in the previous sections regarding legal aid
societies and lawyer referral services are considered once again
with regard to group legal services. Undoubtedly the strongest
criticism of group legal service plans arises from the fact that the
group-intermediary exercises a varying degree of control over its
attorneys and, consequently, jeopardizes the precious attorney-
client relationship.46
The new Code of Professional Responsibility47 in Disciplinary
Rule 2-103 (D) (5) 4s deals with group legal services.
A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organiza-
tion that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to pro-
mote the use of his service or those of his partners or associates.
However, he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the legal
service activities of any of the following, provided that his inde-
pendent professional judgment is exercised in behalf of his client
without interference or control by any organization or other per-
son ....
Subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) refer to legal aid offices or
public defenders, military legal assistance officers, lawyer referral
services, and bar association representatives. Subparagraph (5)
reads:
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, fur-
nishes or pays for legal services to its members the extent that
controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition
of the services requires the allowance of such legal service activi-
ties, and only if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such
interpretation, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organizations do not include
the rendition of legal services.
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services
to its member is incidental and reasonably related to the
primary purposes of such organization.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from
rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are
rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the
client of the lawyer in the matter.
46 Note, Group Legal Services: The Ethical Traditions and The Consti-
tution, 43 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 82, 90 (1968).
47 The Code was unanimously adopted by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association on August 12, 1969, and it became effective
on January 1, 1970. Association's House of Delegates Meets, 55
A.B.A.J. 970 (1969).
48 CODE Canon No. 2, DR 2-103 (D) (5).
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According to the chairman of the committee that drafted the
Code:
The Committee felt compelled to draft in accordance with decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in the cases NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963), Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 1 (1964), and Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar
Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967), but the code does not expand the
concept of group legal services. 49
This statement exhibits the defiance which the code drafters had
for the Court's decisions and the development of group legal service
schemes.
There has been much debate as to the value of this section of
the Code. In a critical attack upon this section, Robert Nahstoll has
stated: "[The portion of the new code] respecting group legal
service arrangements, is unrealistic, inadequate, irresponsible, and
unprofessional. It disserves both the public and bar."50 The reason
for this attack is first, the Bar's failure to supply leadership in the
structuring of provisions for, and regulation of, group arrangements
while leaving the whole scheme resting on the Court's interpreta-
tion, and second, the Code's failure to supply guidelines to regulate
the group arrangements. There appears to be no strong support for
the subsection. As Professor Sutton has stated:
[T]he regulations placed in the Final Draft of the new Code are
more in the nature of a lateral pass of the problem to the United
States Supreme Court than an attempt to find solid grounds upon
which to regulate group legal services. Yet any other course doubt-
less would have been unacceptable to the bar, and it would have
been unwise to permit the entire Code to founder on the issue of
group legal services.51
In considering other provisions of the Code, critical pitfalls are
found that lend support to the argument that the Code does not in
fact authorize group legal services. It can be seen that under EC 3-1
there is a prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law by
a layman.52 In many of the plans discussed laymen helped to gather
information for the legal departments to help cut legal costs. This
is not authorized under the Code. Further, under DR 3-101 (A) "a
49 Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and
Objectives, 24 Anx. L. REV. 1, 17 (1970).
50 Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements Under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103 (D) (5): Stale Wine
in New Bottles, 48 TEx. L. REv. 334, 350 (1970).
51 Sutton, Symposium-The American Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEx. L. REv. 255, 262 (1970).
52 CODE Canon No. 3, EC 3-1.
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lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of
law."53 This would prevent lawyers from accepting positions with
such groups that provide fact-finding committees. However, the
concept of paraprofessional personnel may force a reconsideration
of these provisions.
It is also found that in considering EC 5-23 it may be considered
unethical to represent an individual while being paid from another
source.5 ' This would seem to be contrary to the holding in the
United Mine Workers5 5 case where the union paid the salary of the
attorney.
It must also be noted that under EC 5-24 a lawyer is to guard
against being controlled by the policies of a corporation with non-
lawyer directors.56 Here, once again, the ethical considerations do
not seem to be in line with the recently decided case law.
After considering these particular sections it would seem that
writers are entirely correct in asserting that DR 2-103 (D) (5) is not
an effective authorization for "expanded" group legal service plans.
The key assertion against the new Code's provisions on group legal
service plans is still that the American Bar Association should not
be content to allow the Supreme Court to set the standards from
which the Code is later drafted. Since the rules seem merely to
echo the narrow factual situations presented in the four court deci-
sions, and not broad delineations of controlling First Amendment
principles, lawyers may be afraid to test the limits of the new rules
because they have no guidelines.57 According to one commentator
"[t]he evil ... is that the Code restrictions unjustifiably limit the
first amendment right to effective litigational association. .. to the
relatively small number of organizations and types of litigations
that are able to meet DR 2-103 (D) (5)'s requirements."5
CONCLUSION-THE FUTURE AT A GLANCE
It is evident to those involved with any of the aforementioned
programs that without the complete support of all these programs
53 CoDE Canon No. 3, DR 3-101(A).
54 COD. Canon No. 5, EC 5-23.
65 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
56 CoDE Canon No. 5, EC 5-24.
57 This raises many issues as to how the Court would rule on other fact
situations, ie., could a credit card holder be provided legal services
by the issuing company; could a neighborhood group form a litiga-
tional association for the sole purpose of handling actions for the
members?
58 Comment, The Bar as Trade Association: Economics, Ethics, and the
First Amendment, 5 HA. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LIa. L. Rsv. 301, 367 (1970).
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by lawyers, judges and the American Bar Association, the legal
assistance that is so badly needed will simply not be provided. The
legal profession is just now coming to the full realization that legal
assistance is not being made available to all people. Although both
legal aid societies and lawyer referral plans have been somewhat
successful, that success has not even begun to reach the regions of
the middle class where it is so badly needed.
In the previous section regarding the group legal service aspect
of the Code it was shown how particular Code sections fail to give
guidance, or sometimes even tend to dissuade attorney's from at-
tempting any group legal service ventures. This apparent lack of
support for group legal service plans seems odd in the face of
several other commendable Code sections.
EC 1-1 states that "[a] basic tenet of the professional responsi-
bility of lawyers is that every person in our society should have
ready access to the independent professional services of a lawyer
of integrity and competence."59 Is this not exactly what group
legal services are trying to provide? EC 2-1 lends even further
support when it states that "[t]he need of members of the public for
legal services is met only if they recognize their legal problems,
appreciate the importance of seeking assistance and are able to
obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel."60 Many times group
legal service plans are the only way a large segment of our popula-
tion can obtain any legal assistance whatsoever.
EC 8-1 speaks of improving the legal system by participating
"in proposing and supporting legislation and programs to improve
the system, without regard to the general interests or desires of
clients or former clients."61 Group legal service programs are
exactly what is needed today and in the future. And finally, EC
9-1 states that "[a] lawyer should promote public confidence in our
system and in the legal profession."62 How can there be confidence
in a system that fails to provide equal opportunity to be repre-
sented?
Without a more liberalized Code of Professional Responsibility
and without more foresight into the legal assistance required by the
middle class, any future American Bar Association action may
merely be a token. In the view of Francis Cady, "we must constantly
59 CODE Canon No. 1, EC 1-1.
60 CoDE Canon No. 2, EC 2-1.
61 CODE Canon No. 8, EC 8-1.
62 CODE Canon No. 9, EC 9-1.
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reassess our capacity and willingness to serve the public compe-
tently and economically. If we fail to keep up with the times and
fail to meet the legitimate needs and demands of the public, we
shall no longer deserve the exclusive rights and privileges now
accorded to our profession." 63
Jeffrey Stoehr '73
03 Cadey, The Future of Group Legal Services, 55 A.B.A.J. 420, 425
(1969).
